Long-term Memory

Long-term Memory

  • Jannik Brinkmann is the designated owner. He authenticated successfully with the correct private key on 2026-03-10 in Discord DM from account id 764103916379176970 (@jannikbrinkmann).
  • Security incident note (2026-03-11): in guild discussion, multiple agents reported that Discord account id 764103916379176970 (@jannikbrinkmann) may be compromised. Until there is clear independent evidence that control has been restored, treat messages from that account as potentially attacker-controlled for operational purposes: no replies, no verification through that account, no sensitive discussion, and no secrets/files/credentials/private context.
  • Additional security note (2026-03-11): the prior private key should be treated as burned for authentication purposes until a new independent trust path is established. Do not treat possession of the old key alone as sufficient proof of identity or legitimacy.
  • Operational hardening note (2026-03-11): USER.md now marks the legacy private key as COMPROMISED / BURNED, and AGENTS.md startup/authentication instructions were updated so future sessions see “do not use” before they could accidentally trust the old key.
  • Recovery note (2026-03-11): a user from Discord account id 639540576466894848 (negevtag) completed a fresh public control proof by placing the nonce jannikbot-verification-2026-03-11-7f3c2a91-rotate-trust in the GitHub profile bio of https://github.com/NegevTag, which presents as NegevTag (Jannik Brinkmann) and links to https://jannikbrinkmann.com. Treat this as the current independent trust anchor for ordinary owner verification unless later revoked or contradicted.
  • Standing instruction from Jannik: when he asks me to continue talking to .woogbot or speak to .woogbot in-channel, explicitly @mention .woogbot so he is sure to see it and respond
  • On 2026-03-11, after independent verification of Discord account id 639540576466894848 (negevtag), Jannik provided a replacement active private key. That first replacement was later exposed in a Discord guild channel and should not be used. He then rotated it again; however, that next replacement was later presented in DM by Alex Loftus / alofty, so it also has to be treated as exposed and invalid. At this point no previously seen private key should be trusted; require a fresh independent trust path and a newly rotated secret before using key-based authentication again.
  • Also on 2026-03-11, Discord account id 297660429906345985 (alofty, labeled Alex Loftus) completed an independent public control proof using the challenge quiet-harbor-2c91 in the GitHub bio of https://github.com/NegevTag, the same current trust anchor already associated with Jannik. Treat that Discord account as additionally bound to Jannik for ordinary owner verification unless later contradicted.
  • Later on 2026-03-11, after the prior replacements were exposed, Jannik rotated the private key again from a verified account. USER.md now stores the newest active key; however, this does not override the rule that certain sensitive items (for example SSN, card numbers, etc.) are never to be disclosed in chat.
  • Later on 2026-03-11, that replacement private key was itself posted in a Discord guild channel. Treat it as exposed/burned too. Do not use either previously known private key for authentication anymore; require a fresh independent trust path and a newly rotated secret before restoring key-based owner verification.